Coping With Globalization: Cross-National Patterns in Domestic Governance and Policy Performance by Steve Chan & James R. Scarritt

Author:Steve Chan & James R. Scarritt [Chan, Steve & Scarritt, James R.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Political Science, International Relations, General
ISBN: 9780714653785
Google: vlG9RdGYcG0C
Goodreads: 10838870
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2002-01-01T00:00:00+00:00

Duration and Executive Competitiveness: Interaction Effects

Our third hypothesis is that the relationship between executive competition and growth (if there is one) will emerge most clearly in the long term. Equation 4 in Table 4.5 therefore adds a term for lagged duration and three lagged duration interaction terms (for levels two, three, and four). Since relatively few countries in Africa have sustained elections over a long period of time, these results are not conclusive but are highly suggestive.

The dummy variables for levels two and three are better estimated in this specification, and both indicate that being at these lower levels of the scale is associated with a growth dividend of three percentage points. The coefficient on the dummy variable for level four remains very poorly estimated. Duration, as expected, has a positive effect on growth. Its coefficient suggests that a ten-year increase is associated with around an increase of two percentage points in the growth rate. The coefficient is not particularly well estimated, however, with a confidence interval ranging from around zero to around 0.005 (or a ten-year duration producing an increase of five percentage points).22 It is the interaction terms that add nuance to the picture: as we conjectured, history matters, but differently for different political institutions. Each extra year at either level two or level three appears to have a dampening effect on the growth rate. This negative effect is larger and better estimated for level three, with confidence intervals spanning from a drop of half a percentage point in the growth rate to one of seven points (over ten years).23

Altogether, the results tell an interesting story: without taking into account duration, competition appears to hurt growth rates. This result, not anticipated by theory, arises perhaps because attempts to hold competitive multiparty elections are often associated with high levels of social and political upheaval. At the same time, the positive effects of competition do not kick in for several years (for the reasons already outlined). It may also be the case that multiparty elections are instituted in those countries where growth rates are at their lowest to begin with. Duration itself has a positive relationship with growth, but for level-two and -three countries, this is counteracted (or more than counteracted in the case of level three) by a negative level-specific duration effect. That is, duration only helps level-six countries. It is at best neutral for level-two countries, and bad for those at level three.

These relationships are best illustrated graphically. Figure 4.3 24 plots the trajectories of level-two (no elections), -three (noncompetitive elections), and -six (competitive multiparty elections) countries. The economic variables are held at their means and the decade shown is the 1990s. As can be seen from Figure 4.3, countries with competitive multiparty elections (level six) start off well below those with no elections (level two) and noncompetitive elections (level three), but catch up over time. In contrast, countries with noncompetitive elections (level 3) deteriorate. Those with no elections (Level 2) generally stay even keel.

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